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Abatract
In a seminal paper, Ariel Rubinatein hae ehown that impatience
impliea determinatenesa of the 2-peraon bargaining problem. In thia
note we ahow that this reault depends also on the asaumption that
the eet of alternativea ie a continuum. If the pie can be divided only
in finitely many different waye, (for example, becauae the pie is an
amount of money and there ia a amalleat money unit), any partition
can be obtained as the reault of a aubgame perfect equilibrium if the







A natural way of modelling two-person bargaining as an extensive game
makes use of a game structure in which two players take turns in making
bids. In each round one player makes a bid; then the other player either
accepts or rejects this offer; in case of rejection the rejector makes the next
bid, etc. We use the term "alternating bid models" for bargaining games of
this structure. A pioneering investigation of alternating bid models is due
to Ingolf Stàhl (1972). Later Ariel Rubinstein has created a very influential
bargaining theory based on an alternating bid model (Rubinstein (1982)).
The bargaining problem consídered here is the division of a fixed amount
of money. Rubinstein's model permits arbitrary divisions and thereby pro-
vides a continuum of possible agreements. An alternative to the assumption
of infinite divisibility of money is the introduction of a smallest money unit.
It is our aim to explore the consequences of this assumption for alternating
bid bargaining. As (ar as other assumptions are concerned our analysis is
based on Rubinstein's framework.
Rubinstein's theory specifies a unique solution, the uniquely determined
subgame perfect equilibrium of his model. It will be shown that the intro-
duction of a smallest money unit destroys Rubinstein's uniqueness result.
If both players are risk neutral, the amount of money to be distributed is
~ 50,000, the smallest money unit is lc, the yearly interest rate is 10~o and
one bargaining round takes 1 minute, then all divisions of the S 50,000 are
supported by subgame perfect equilibria of the modífied model (see propo-
sition 1 and the explanation of table 1 in section 4).
Ingolf Stáhl already investigated alternating bid models with a finite
number of agreemente. (Stàhl (1972), also see Stáhl (1988) in which Stàhl's4
original model is compared to that of Rubinstein). He examined models
of finite and of infinite length. However, his research questions were dif-
ferent from ours. He aimed at sufficient conditions for uniqueness. We are
interested in non-uniqueness as a consequence of the presence of a amallest
money unit.
It is impossible to construct an absolutely reafistic bargaining model.
Every real bargaining situation has many special features which are minor
influences on the bargaining result. Idealization is an unavoidable ingredi-
ent of model construction. Is it really necessary to model a relatively in-
conspicuous institutional detail like the presence of a smallest money unit?
Maybe the correct answer is no. However, Rubinstein's theory heavily re-
lies on very small time coats due to discounting. It should not take more
than one minute to make a bid. The bidder does not have to do more than
pronounce a number. Even for quite sizable amounts of money the interest
for one minute at a reasonable yearly rate is very small. Why should very
small intereat losses be modelled explicitely? Maybe also here the answer
is no.
The smallest money unit and the time discount are both minot strate-
gic influences, but these forces interact. Therefore, either both should be
considered or both should be neglected. In this sense Rubinstein's model
is an imbalanced idealization. His theory relies on an explicitely modelled
weak influence and ignores a weak counteracting force.
Assume that both bargainers are risk neutral; let A be the amount of
money to be distributed and let ó be the discount rate for one bargaining
round. We assume that both players have the same discount rate. In Ru-
binstein's theory the solution is of the following type: A player who makes
a bid asks for x. A player accepts every offer which gives him at least A- x5
and rejects everything else. The solution requires indifference between A-x
and bx. This yields x - A~(1 f b).
Rubinstein's theory excludes strategy combinations of the following type
as possible solutions: Player 1 always asks for y and player 2 always asks
for A- y. Both accept any offet which gives them at least what they ask
for and reject all others. If player 1 asks for a little more, say y f e, then
player 2[acea a choice between A- y- e for acceptance and b(A - y) for
rejection. Obviously he must accept, if we have e C (1 - b)(A - y). This
contradicts the assumption of a subgame perfectness.
Now consider the consequencea of the introduction oí a amallest money
unit g. Agreement payoffs must be integer multiples of g. If now player
1 wants to ask for more than y, he has to demand at least y~- g. If g
is greater than (1 - b)A player 1 cannot give an incentive to player 2 to
accept less than A- y. The smallest money unit prevents him from in-
creasing his demand by an amount e which is smaller than the interest loss
(1 -b)(A-y). This heuristic argument indicates why Rubinstein's unique-
ness result is destroyed by the introduction of a smallest money unit. The
siae of the smallest money unit puts a lower bound on exploitable interest
losses on the other side. Note that decreasing the time between offers corre-
aponds to increasing b and that [or b sufficiently large always g 1(1 - á)A.
Hence, for short intervals between offers it may be expected that indeed any
distribution can be obtained by some subgame períect equilibrium. (See
Proposition 1).
In Rubinstein's bargaining solution agreement is reached at once. More
than one bargaining round cannot be played, unless mistakes are made.
Contrary to this in the presence of a smallest money unit subgame perfect
equilibrium may involve many bacgaining rounds, before an agreement is
~x6
reached (proposition 2) 1.
Undoubtedly Rubinstein's ingenious bargaining theory merits our admi-
ration, but we cannot avoid the conclusion, that his model does not provide
a balanced idealization of real bargaining situations. The driving force be-
hind his uniqueness result ie provided by the exploitability of small interest
losses by even smaller increases of a bidder's demand. In the presence of a
smalle.st money unit such destabilization possibilities are easily loat, since
it becomea impossible to deviate sufficiently little. Needless to say that
the same critique applies to more elaborate models of bargaining that also
assume perfect divisibility of money, such as the various strategic models
of bargaining under incomplete information. (Let us just quote Sobel and
Takahashi (1982) as a representative example).
Our analysis is based on the same game theoretic rationality assump-
tions as Rubinstein's theory. Presumably teal bargaining behaviour would
not be influenced by a smallest money unit of insignificant size and equally
insignificant time discounts. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to use the con-
cept of a subgame perfect equilibrium point in order to explore the inter-
action and the comparative importance of both influences.
2 The Bargaining Model
Two players, denoted by 1 and 2, have to divide an amount of money
(normalised to) 1. Let g~ 0 denote the smallest money unit. The set of
possible agreements is
lOsborne and Rubinstein ( 1989, Sect. 3.9.1.) give an example to show that finitely
many alternatives may lead to multiple equilibria and to delay. They do not inveetigate
the general consequencea ofshrinking the time between offers.X-{(k,g,k2g) ~ k; E N,(k, f k,)g C 1}
and X` denotes the set of efficient agreements ((kl f kZ)g - 1).
(1)
Bargaining takes place over time, starts at t- 0, and proceeds accord-
ing to the following rules:
RovNn t(t E N,t even): Player 1 proposes x E X; after hearing 1's
proposal, player 2 either accepts or rejects. If 2 accepts, the game termi-
nates with agreement x, otherwise the game moves to round t f 1.
RoUND t(t E N,t odd): Player 2 proposes x E X, after hearing 2's
proposal, player 1 either accepts or rejects. If 1 accepts, the game ends
with agreement x, otherwise the game reaches round t-F 1.
Denote by G x, t ~ the outcome where agreement on x is reached in round
t and let D denote perpetual disagreement. Let 0 be the length of a single
bargaining round. We will assume that there ezist constants T,,TS,1 0,
and strictly increasing concave functions U,, U2 (having domain [0,1]) with
U;(0) - 0 such that the preferences of the players can be repreaented by
the utility functions V; given by
V,(G x,t ~) - e-''o`U;(x) and V,(D) - 0 (2)
For justification oí this assumption, we refer to Fishburn and Rubinstein
( 1982).
The above fully describes the game to be denoted I'(0). Strategies, Nash
equilibria and (subgame) perfect equilibria are defined in the standard way,a
hence, these definitions will not be repeated here (see Rubinstein (1982)).
Rather, we directly turn to our main results.
3 Results
PROPOSITION 1. If 0 ia au)~iciently amal! , apecifically if 0 ia auch
that for i- 1, 2
U:(1 - 9)~U.(1) G
e-.,o (3)
then, for any eBïcient agreement x E X` there exiata a auógame perfecE
equíliórium of P(~) that reaulta in the outcome C x,0 1.
PROOF. Note that (3) says that player i prefers getting the full amount
1 one period later to receiving 1-g now. Since U; is concave this condition
implies that for all x; E~g, 1~
U;(x: - g)~U.(x~) ~ e-''o (4)
Let x F X` and write x-(xi,x7). Consider the pair of etationairy strate-
gies o~ -(v~ , vs) defined by
v; : Always propose x;
Accept any proposal y with y; 1 x;,
Reject any other proposal.
If o-~ is played, the outcome G x, 0) results. We claim that Q~ is a
subgame perfect equilibrium ií (3) is satisfied. Because of stationarity, it
suffices to show that one-period deviations are not profitable. Hence, we9
must verify that it does not pay to deviate in round t when from round
t f 1 on play will always be in accordance to a~. Obviously, given the ac-
ceptance~rejectance decision of the uther player, the best one can propuse
is x since x is efficient in X. Clearly, it is also optimal for player i to accept
any offer that yields him at least x;. The crucial step is to verify that, if
x; ~ 0, it is optimal for player i to reject any offer y with y; C x;. However,
this is guaranteed by (4). O
All equilibria constructed thus far result in an immediate efficient agree-
ment. However, since there is a multiplicity of such equilibria, it is easy tu
construct alternative equilibria that du not have these nice properties. The
idea is to sustain a path ~r in which both players have positive payoffs with
the threat to continue with the equilibrium from Proposition 1 that yields
player á the payoff zero if á deviates írom ~r. Formally,this construction is
carried out in Proposition 2. It is convenient to introduce the following
notation: x' -(1,0),xZ -(0,1) and o' - v~'. Finally, iT denotes the
player who proposes in round T(hence iT - Tmod2 -~ 1).
PROPOSITION 2. Let x E X with x ~(0, 0) and T E N. If 0
eatiefeee (3J, there exíeta a aubgame perfect equilibrium of I'(0) that re~ulta
in the outcom e C x,T ~.
PROOF. We will confine ourselves to the case where xlxz 1 0 and leave
the details of the remaining cases to the reader. Consider the strategy pair
o - (ol,os) defined by
o; :In round t(t G T) : Propose x`; accept x' but reject any other proposal.
In round T: Propose x; accept x and x', but reject any other proposal.
ln round t (t ~ T) : Play accurding to o;T.10
Let rr(ol,~a) be the path induced by (or,vZ). The strategy pair v-
(ái,á2) is constructed from o by means of
i~; : I'lay according Lo o;, however, if in any ruund f. ' T there is a devíation
frun, a(o~,nz) and if the tirst deviation ie by player k, then irnmedi-
ately after this deviation switch to playing v3-k for the remainder oí
the game Z.
We claim that Q is a subgame perfect equilibrium of I'(~) whenever (3)
is satisfied. Note that ó resulta in the outcome G x,T ~. To prove the
claim, it sufïtces (because oí Proposition 1) to show that deviating in some
round t c T is not profitable. However, this is easily verified: If a proposing
player deviates he ends up with zero, hence, deviating is not profitable for
him. Deviating is clearly nut attractive for the responding player as long
as the proposal is on the equilibium path (it will yield payoff zero). If the
proposer has deviated, rejection yields the responder 1 in the next period,
hence, ií (3) is satisfied, he should reject anything less than 1, exactly as Q
says that he should do. Consequently, á is a subgame perfect equilibrium
if 0 is small.~
Proposition 2 shows that really almost anything can happen in a sub-
game perfect equilibrium if the time between offers is small. The only
uutcumes that are nol covered by thc lhcurem are (i) agreement on the
outcome in which no player receives anything and (ii) perpetual disagree-
ment. It is easy to see that none of these outcomes can arise in a subgame
perfect equilibrium if there exists some x E X with xlx2 ~ 0. Hence,
Proposition 2 fully describes the set of all subgame perfect equilibrium out-
comes.
~Note that, if i ia the proposet in tound t G T, then playet j will switch to ~ nlrendy
in round t.11
4 The Risk Neutral Case
In this sectiun we confine ourselves to the case where players are risk neu-
tral, i.e. u;(x) -- x. This case is most favotable for the point we wish to
make. lf both players are (equally) risk averse, the range of equilibrium
payo(ís will be smaller: If the utility function v displays greater risk aver-
siun that u, then v(x - g)w(x) 1 u(x - g)~u(x) so that is becomes more
difficult to obtain x in a subgame equilibrium (cf. Eq. (4)).
Let us first illustrate the bound un 0 given in (3) by períorming some
numerical calculations. Take rl - rz - lOplo per year, and let the smallest
money unit be 1 cent (v; 0.01). Proposition 1 implies that, if the time be-
tween offers is 0, any efficient division of an amuunt up to A(~) (as given
in Table 1) can be obtained in a subgame perfect equilibrium.
~ A(0)
1 day S 36.50
1 hour ~ 876
1 min á 52,576
l sec ~ 3,225,806
Table 1.
Ií the amount of money to be divided is larger than A(0), then the
simple strategies from Proposition 1 are no longer in equilibrium if x is
"sufficiently asymmetric", but, of course, there may be more sophisticated
equilibria that still result in such x. For given r;, U;, ~,g and an amount to
be divided, A, we have not computed the (absolute) gap between the beat
and the worst equilibrium payoff (we conjecture that, it remains bounded
away far from zeru as A tends to infinity), however, it is easy tu see that
this gap becomes smaller relative to A. Proving the latter is e.quivalent to
shuwing that the gap tends tu zero when g tends to zero, with A fixed at 1
and all other parameters remaining constant as well. Assume r~ - rz and12
write b - e-"o.
Denute by M (resp. m) the supremum (resp. infimum) uf the aubgame
pcrfect equilibrinm payuffs of player I in I'(~). P'ullowing the argument
outlined in Shaked and Sutton [I'J84~, it ia easy to aee that in the generic
case where êM and bm are not integer multiples of g, M and m muat satiafy
the equations
M-1-[bm] (5)
m - 1 -- (bM] (6)
where ~bx] denotes the s~nallest integer multiple o( g that is at least equal
to bx. 'l'he Fqs. (5) and (Fi) imply
M - [bM] - m - [bm], (7)
which is equivalent to saying that there is some k E N such that
n-(k }-1)gCbnGn-kgfornE{m,M}, (8)
Rewriting the last inequality yields
kgcn(1-b)G(ktl)gfornE{m,M}, (9)
which implies
M- m c g~(1 - b). (10)13
We see that M- m tends to zero iC g tends to zero. Furthermore, if g tenda
tu zeru, ~bm~ cunverges to bm, so that the limit oC M solves the equation
M - 1 - bM (11)
an expression that is familiar from the work of Rubinstein. Hence, we may
state
PROPOSITION 3. If g tenda to zero, the payo,(je aaaociated to any
auógame perfect equitiórium of I'(0) converge to the payoffa of the unique
aubgame perfect equitiGríum of the continuurn game.
Finally, it is oi some interest to see how the properties of the finite horizon
bargaining game P(O, T), (i.e. truncate I'(0) after T rounda) are affected
by the introduction of a smallest money unit. It is trivial to see that, for a
fixed horizon T, if 0 is aufficiently small, all subgame períect equilibria of
I'(~, T) yield the player who has the final right to make a proposal almoat
1. More interesting, however, is the queation what happens for fized 0 and
g, when T tends to infinity. The analysis is easy if inequality (3) is satisfied.
Let player 2 make the final proposal. In the last round, this player obtains
at least 1-g, so that in the second to last round he rejecta any proposal that
yields him less than 1- g. Consequently, the equilibrium payoffa o[ player 1
in the second to last round are bounded above by g. Therefore, in the third
to last round player 2's equilibrium payoff is again at least 1 - g, and the
argument can be continued to the beginning of the game: The equilibrium
payoffs of the player who makes the last proposal are bounded below 3 by
3There ezist equilibria in which, in the second to Inst round, plnyer 1 mnkea the proposal
(1,0) that is rejected and upon which plnyer 2 continues with (g, 1- g). lt is not optimnl
for player 1 to make an alternntive proposnl since player 2 would interpret this ns a signnl19
e-'.o(1 - g). Comparing this result with Proposition 2 we see that there is
a discontinuity at T- oo. This discontinuity is not present in Rubinstein's
continuous specification. In that case, also the finite horizon model has a
unique subgame perfect equilibrium and, as T tends to infinity, the payoffa
associated with this equilibrium converge to the equilibrium payoffs of the
infinite horizon game.
to continue with (0,1)in the final round (and hcnce, would reject it unless the propoanl
itself was (0,1)).15
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